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Abstract 
In recent years, a proliferation of books about empathy, cooperation and pro-
social behaviors (Brooks, 2011a) has significantly influenced the discourse of 
the life-sciences and reversed consolidated views of nature as a place only for 
competition and aggression. In this article I describe the recent contribution of 
three disciplines – moral psychology (Jonathan Haidt), primatology (Frans de 
Waal) and the neuroscience of morality – to the present transformation of 
biology and evolution into direct sources of moral phenomena, a process here 
named the ‘moralization of biology’. I conclude by addressing the ambivalent 
status of this constellation of authors, for whom today ‘morality comes 
naturally’: I explore both the attractiveness of their message, and the 
problematic epistemological assumptions of their research-programs in the 
light of new discoveries in developmental and molecular biology. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, a proliferation of books about empathy, cooperation and 
pro-social behaviors (Brooks, 2011a) has significantly influenced the 
discourse of the life-sciences and reversed consolidated views of nature 
as a place only for competition, selfishness and aggression. Titles 
emphasizing the intrinsic morality or sociality1 of our evolved nature 
have provoked a rethinking of the relationship between biology and the 
                                                     
1For the notion of a natural morality see the recent volumes: Hauser, Moral Minds (2006); 
Gazzaniga, The Ethical Brain (2005); Verplaetse et al., The Moral Brain (2009); Haidt, The 
Right- eous Mind (2012); Keltner, Born to be Good (2009); de Waal, Good-Natured (1996); Zak, 
The Moral Molecule (2012). For natural, innate sociality see: Goleman, Social Intelligence 
(2006); Brooks, The Social Animal (2011b); Nowak, SuperCooperators (2011); Keltner et al., 
The Compassionate Instinct (2010); de Waal, The Age of Empathy (2009). 
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moral phenomenon, as well as the emergence of new ideas of sociality, 
altruism and hope. The dismissal of the ‘dog-eat-dog’ view of nature and 
a new emphasis on the ‘bright side of biology’ (Nowak, 2011) have to be 
situated in important technical changes in the evolutionary literature 
since the 1970s. Take, for instance, this passage from Ghiselin’s classic 
(1974) The Economy of Nature and the Evolution of Sex: 
 
The evolution of society fits the Darwinian paradigm in its most 
individualistic form. Nothing in it cries out to be otherwise explained. 
The economy of nature is competitive from beginning to end What 
passes for cooperation turns out to be a mixture of opportunism and 
exploitation. Scratch an ‘altruist’, and watch a ‘hypocrite’ bleed. 
(Ghiselin, 1974: 247) 
 
Now compare it with what the editors of a book titled The 
Compassionate Instinct write today: 
 
We are witnessing a revolution in the scientific understanding of 
human nature. Where once science painted humans as self-seeking 
and warlike    today scientists of many disciplines are uncovering 
the deep roots of human goodness. Empathy, gratitude, 
compassion, altruism, fairness, trust, and cooperation, once thought 
to be aberrations from the tooth-and-claw natural order of things, 
are now being revealed as core features of primate evolution. 
(Keltner et al., 2010: 5–6) 
 
In addition to Ghiselin consider another classic from the 1970s: 
Accepted manuscript of Meloni, M. (2013). Moralizing biology: the appeal and limits of the new compassionate 
view of nature. History of the Human Sciences, 26(3), 82-106. Pls refer to final version at: 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0952695113492163 
 
 
3  
Richard Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene (2006[1976]: 4, 139), with its notion 
that ‘anything that has evolved by natural selection should be selfish’ 
and that ‘we must teach our children altruism, for we cannot expect it to 
be part of their biological nature’. Again, compare this with a quotation 
from Frans de Waal’s recent The Age of Empathy (2009: 5): ‘we 
[humans] are group animals: highly cooperative, sensitive to injustice, 
sometimes warmongering, but mostly peace loving’. 
Not by chance two references from the 1970s were selected here to 
stress the intellectual differences with the present understanding of the 
relationship between biology and altruism/morality. Evolutionary 
biologists in the 1970s were working within a theoretical framework 
marked by the dismissal of group theory (Williams, 1996[1966]), and the 
rise of ‘inclusive fitness’ (Hamilton, 1964), ‘methodological 
individualism’ (Ghiselin, 1974), the ‘gene’s eye view’ (Dawkins, 
2006[1976]) and the elaboration of theories of altruism (kin selection: 
Hamilton, 1964; reciprocal altruism: Trivers, 1971) that conceived it 
primarily  as a disguised form of self-interest (or the genes’ interest). In 
such  a framework, a costly behavior (meaning: reducing reproductive 
fitness) like altruism was correctly said to be the ‘central theoretical 
problem’ of a newborn discipline like sociobiology (E. O. Wilson, 1975: 
3). Clearly, it would be wrong to give the impression that these major 
tenets of evolutionary theory have all been turned upside-down now and 
certainly, beneath the most fashionable repackaging of biology in terms 
of altruism and ultra-sociality today, many things (especially at the 
conceptual level) remain continuous with the 1970s, as I will try to 
illustrate in the final section. On the other hand, however, it cannot be 
denied that, since the time of The Selfish Gene, a number of highly 
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visible technical changes in the evolutionary literature have occurred, 
and made room for the emergence of a different (or at least, broader) 
take on the relationship between biology and morality. A good analogy 
to explain continuities and discontinuities with the 1970s is to think in 
terms of an increasingly widening circle encompassing the possibility of 
altruism, cooperation and morality within biology. Taking as a starting 
point the above-mentioned 1970s’ notions of selfishness and 
individualism as the only biologically plausible realities, and the 
subsequent explanation of altruism in terms of mere reciprocity or kin 
selection, then one can see a first attempt to enlarge this circle through 
the application of game theory and complex mathematical models to 
explain how cooperation can emerge and remain stable from a non-
cooperative starting position (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod, 
1984; Axelrod and Dion, 1988); indeed, these accounts have expanded to 
such a point that, today, cooperation has been re-characterized as ‘a third 
fundamental principle of evolution beside mutation and natural 
selection’ (Nowak, 2006: 1563; Nowak, 2011). Parallel to these 
developments, a return to a more pluralistic view of natural selection has 
contributed significantly to the present scenario; this is the case in 
relation to the recent comeback of the notion of ‘group selection’, which 
was dismissed in the late 1960s because of its lack of rigour (Williams, 
1996[1966]), and has today regained respectability (Sober and Wilson, 
1998; Borrello, 2005; D. S. Wilson and E. O. Wilson, 2007), especially 
when conceived in cultural terms (Boyd et al., 2003). Group selection, 
indirect reciprocity and network reciprocity, along with the two previous 
notions of kin selection and direct reciprocity, have been recently 
described as the 5 basic mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation 
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(Nowak, 2006). A further contribution to a change of paradigm over the 
last decade has come from the work of experimental economists who 
have shown how, in ‘public goods’ games, unrelated people tend to 
exhibit high levels of cooperation, even in non-repeated interactions, as 
well as a propensity to punish norm-violators at their own cost, what is 
called ‘altruistic punishment’ (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2003; de Quervain et al., 2004). This array of experimental 
studies has shown how human altruism is a much broader phenomenon 
than would be expected according to theories of reciprocal altruism and 
reputation-based cooperation, and takes the form of so-called ‘strong 
reciprocity’ (Fischbacher and Gachter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 
2003; Gintis, 2000; Bowles and Gintis, 2004).   A final expansion of the 
circle of morality has come in recent years from the increasing number 
of studies emphasizing how altruism, helping behaviours and social 
networks can be ‘intrinsically beneficial’ to human health (Lozada et al., 
2011; Brown et al., 2009; Cohen and Janicki-Deverts, 2009; Kok and 
Fredrickson, 2010), and how social cooperation (Rilling et al., 2002) and 
charitable donations are inherently rewarding experiences for the brain 
(Moll, Krueger et al., 2006). 
All these technical innovations in evolutionary literature constitute the 
intellectual background upon which the present changes in the 
relationship between biology and morality are taking place. In a subtle 
but not irrelevant transformation of E. O. Wilson’s famous dictum ‘the 
time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of 
philosophers and biologicized’ (E. O. Wilson, 1975: 562), the 
sociobiological project of a ‘biologization of morality’ 2  seems today 
                                                     
2 Wilson dedicates to ethics a section of the final chapter of his Sociobiology but it is worth 
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increasingly transformed into a ‘moralization of biology’. By 
moralization of biology I here mean that in a significant fraction of the 
literature engaged today with biology and morality, some of the 
technical changes above mentioned, and other intellectual innovations 
that will be described next, are being reshaped and increasingly situated 
in a narrative for which biology becomes an immediate source of 
goodness. Far from being invoked as a justification for traditionally 
bleak views of human nature, the biology of the early 21st century 
becomes increasingly celebrated as the right place to look at when 
searching for the origin of pro-social and moral behaviours. 
People familiar with a more skeptical view of morality and evolution 
may want to disagree at this point. First they would object that many of the 
technical changes described in this article do not necessarily imply any slip 
toward an idea of biology as a source of ‘goodness’.3 Second, they would 
remind us that, on the contrary, a very influential line of thought has 
concluded in favor of the idea of morality as a ‘collective illusion fobbed 
off on us by our genes’ (Ruse, 1991: 506); far from vindicating morality, 
evolutionism on this view contributes to a demystification of it (Joyce, 
2001; Street, 2006). Third, the sceptics would object that there is a 
                                                                                                                                       
remembering that the first chapter of his book is titled ‘The Morality of the Gene’. Beyond the 
names already mentioned in this article (like Wilson, Dawkins, Trivers, Hamilton and Ruse), the 
most important references of the period for a sociobiological elaboration of morality are: Barash  
(1977),  Alexander  (1979,  1987),  Stent  (1980).  See  Segerstra˚le  (2001)  for  a  general introduction to 
the sociobiology debate. 
 
3 For instance, the evolutionary notion of cooperation is mainly developed as an intra-group notion 
and could technically be applied even to a cohort of Nazi soldiers who very cooperatively manage an 
extermination camp. Similarly, intergroup conflicts and warfare have been situated at the origin of our 
predisposition to behave altruistically in the attempt to explain why human altruism remains 
‘parochial’, not expanding beyond the group boundary (Bowles, 2009). Also, it is worth noticing that 
in philosophically more refined appraisals of the concept of empathy the possibility that, at least in 
principle, empathy ‘can go awry’ rather than becoming the basis of pro-social behaviours is explicitly 
recognized. A torturer, or a businessman who wanted to defeat a rival, could both make use of 
‘empathy’ for their own goals (Singer and Lamm, 2009). 
Accepted manuscript of Meloni, M. (2013). Moralizing biology: the appeal and limits of the new compassionate 
view of nature. History of the Human Sciences, 26(3), 82-106. Pls refer to final version at: 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0952695113492163 
 
 
7  
tendentious confusion in my terminology, between two senses in which 
we can claim that humans are ‘moral animals’. In the first sense, being a 
moral animal means that ‘the process of evolution has designed us to be 
social, friendly, benevolent’ whereas in the second what is meant is that 
evolution has furnished us with a capacity ‘to think in moral terms’ and 
‘employ moral concepts’ (Joyce, 2006: 3). For the sceptics, while not 
necessarily denying the first denotation (the human as an ‘animal that is 
morally praiseworthy’), it is only the second (the human as an ‘animal 
that morally judges’) that has evolutionary significance. Finally, the 
sceptics will advance the usual warning that, when one comes to morality 
and nature, one cannot deduce an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ as this amounts to 
committing the classical naturalistic fallacy. 
In principle, these are all valid objections. However, I do not think 
that they exhaust all the possible variations that the notion of a biological 
morality may assume today, or that can be used as conclusive arguments 
against my case for a contemporary moralization of biology in a 
significant section of evolutionary writings. First, as philosopher Jesse 
Prinz has claimed (2007), the skeptical reading is not the only game in 
town. Starting from an evolutionary assumption, one might argue that a 
‘realist’ interpretation of morality follows; that is, an interpretation that 
takes the moral phenomenon much more seriously and as ‘truer’ because 
it has been selected by evolution (see, for instance, Richards, 1986, 1987; 
Collier and Stingl, 1993; Rottschaefer and Martinsen, 1990). Second, 
though Joyce’s preference for the notion of the human as an ‘animal that 
morally judges’ is perfectly legitimate, a cartographer of the present 
scenario cannot but notice that it is instead the first horn of his 
distinction, the notion of the human as ‘a morally praiseworthy’ animal, 
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by nature, that is more prevalent today (as I show below) – and the 
interesting intellectual question remains why it is so. Moreover, in spite 
of the ethical skepticism of authors like Ruse and Joyce, it must not be 
forgotten that, as historians have noticed (Bowler, 1986), evolutionary 
thought has always oscillated between a more utilitarian and a more 
romantic reading of morality and nature (Richards, 1987, 1999). The 
analysis I propose suggests that this second reading is coming again to 
the fore today, and in the final section I will explore some of the reasons 
for this intellectual shift. Finally, and more substantially, the apparently 
insuperable hiatus between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ is actually bridged, in the 
literature reviewed below, by the emergence of something that lies in-
between descriptive and prescriptive statements: namely, a picture of 
human nature as innately moral, or, to use a classic nativist metaphor, 
made of marble with veins that incline to certain behaviors rather than 
others. Evolution, according to this view, has filled the first chapters of 
the book of human nature with a certain moral psychology that will 
favor, under normal conditions, not only a capacity to think in moral 
terms, but also a spontaneous inclination to display a vast range of pro-
social and moral behaviors. The presence of this nativist vocabulary is 
one of the most visible features of the current reconceptualization of 
human nature in compassionate terms, and I will devote the final section 
to critiquing it. 
To sum up, the intent of this article is twofold. First, I will delineate a 
preliminary profile for the constellation of authors who are circulating 
this revised picture of human morality, anchored solidly in its 
evolutionary and neurobiological foundations. In what follows I will 
describe three important contributions to this intellectual transformation: 
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the recent version of moral psychology offered by Jonathan Haidt; Frans 
de Waal’s primatology; and the recently born field of the neuroscience 
of morality. Second, I will address the ambivalent status of this group of 
authors for whom today ‘morality comes naturally’. I will focus both on 
the attractiveness of their message in terms of moralizing narratives and 
political hope, and the problematic epistemological assumptions that lie 
behind their research programs, especially in the light of the new 
findings in developmental and molecular biology. 
 
Intuitions matter: The great shift in moral psychology 
If the core notions of morality had remained what they were in the 
mainstream psychological literature of the second half of the 20th 
century, that is, mainly an affair regarding reason, socialization and the 
internalization of cultural norms, then little or no space at all would have 
been available for the current intense exchange between morality and 
biology. The crucial shift that has made a two-directional trading 
between nature and morality possible today has been the renewed 
emphasis on moral experience being the result of automatic, bodily 
processes. This has primarily occurred through a positioning of intuitions 
and emotions at the very core of moral judgement, in opposition to 
rationalistic views that saw them as irrelevant to ethical decision. 
Jonathan Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model (or SIM: Haidt, 2001, 2007, 
2012) is perhaps the most accomplished representative of this new 
‘intuitionist’ trend. 
Haidt opens his very influential ‘The Emotional Dog and Its Rational 
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Tail’ (2001)4 with an exemplar story aimed to show how, in matters of 
morality,  judgement is less  ‘a process of ratiocination and reflection’ 
than something ‘akin to aesthetic judgement’ in which ‘one sees or hears 
about a social event and one instantly feels approval or disapproval’ 
(ibid.: 818). The story told by Haidt is the following: Julie and Mark are 
sister and brother; alone in a cabin near the beach on summer vacation, 
they decide to make love, just for one night, and without any risk of 
pregnancy as they use contraception. 
 
They both enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. 
They keep that night as a special secret, which makes them feel 
even closer to each other. What do you think about that? Was it OK 
for them to make love? (2001: 814) 
Haidt uses the way in which people respond to this scenario almost 
instantaneously, by feeling a ‘quick flash of revulsion’ and knowing 
‘intuitively that something is wrong’ – in a ‘I don’t know, I can’t explain 
it, I just know it’s wrong’ way – to build his model of moral psychology 
according to which ‘quick, automated evaluations’, under the form of 
‘intuitions’, are the first cause of moral judgement. Moral intuition is a 
type of cognition but not reasoning Haidt claims, in an interpretation that 
clearly builds on Humean themes (2001: 814, 816). Whereas in a 
rationalistic view the central element in moral judgement would be a 
slow process of weighing up of the pros and cons of a certain dilemma, 
                                                     
4 Haidt has subsequently modified his ‘emotion–cognition contrast’, into a contrast between ‘two 
kinds of different cognition’: intuition and reasoning. ‘Moral emotions’, though remaining important, 
are for the last version of Haidt’s model only ‘one type of moral intuition, but most moral intuitions 
are more subtle; they don’t rise to the level of emotions’ (Haidt, 2012: 45). The intuition vs reasoning 
contrast is now framed by Haidt in terms of the elephant (automatic processes) and the rider 
metaphor, and Humean sentimentalism is transformed into an ‘intuitionism’. Haidt has claimed that, 
in hindsight, ‘The Emotional Dog’ should have been called ‘The Intuitive Dog’ (ibid.: 48). 
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here moral evaluation is said to originate from fast, automatic processes 
‘in which an evaluative feeling of good–bad or like–dislike appears in 
consciousness without any awareness of having gone through steps of 
search’ (Haidt, 2007: 998). The downplaying of the role of reasoning in 
this model is evident. For Haidt, moral reasoning within the individual is 
mainly a ‘post facto rationalization’ of what we have already experienced 
as gut feelings (2001: 817). From this perspective, more than as 
scientists or philosophers looking for truth, human beings appear like 
‘intuitive lawyers’ or ‘politicians’ (Haidt, 2007: 999; 2012: 75) who are 
keen to justify what is already intuitively perceived. It is only in the 
social context, where people discuss their reasons and are responsive to 
the viewpoints of others, that moral reasoning becomes more important 
(Haidt and Bjorklund, 2007). 
By focusing in particular on phenomena like ‘moral dumbfounding’ 
(the impossibility of offering a full rational justification for what is 
intuitively felt to be wrong), Haidt’s SIM aims to undermine rationalist 
models that have long dominated moral psychology: 
 
Rationalist models made sense in the 1960s and 1970s. The cognitive 
revolution had opened up new ways of thinking about morality and 
moral development, and it was surely an advance to think about 
moral judgment as a form of information processing. But times have 
changed. Now we know (again) that most of cognition occurs 
automatically and outside of consciousness and that people cannot 
tell us how they really reached a judgment. Now we know that 
emotions are not as irrational, that reasoning is not as reliable, and 
that animals are not as amoral as we thought in the 1970s. Moral 
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emotions and intuitions drive moral reasoning, just as surely as a 
dog wags its tail [Haidt concludes]. (2001: 830) 
 
What are the consequences of this shift for the position of morality in 
the sphere of knowledge? For Haidt this intuitionist turn is a vindication 
of E. O. Wilson’s claim that morality, largely based on automatic, non-
rational, evolutionary sources, can be more easily explained by 
biologists than philosophers. If the rationalist model of ‘psychology 
forged its interdisciplinary links with philosophy and education’ (2007: 
998), Haidt’s SIM favours a permanent channel of communication with 
scientific disciplines capable of studying how these automatic intuitions 
arise, focusing, for instance, on their evolutionary antecedents and 
neurobiological underpinnings. If moral judgement is no longer a matter 
of abstract, sophisticated reasoning, why should not one search for its 
predecessors in animal behaviors and the more ancient layers of our 
brain? After all, as Haidt remarks, these automatic processes from which 
moral intuitions spring are the same that have been ‘running animal 
minds for 500 million years’ (2012: 45). Following Haidt’s intuitionist 
turn, morality leaves the shelves of philosophers and educators to reach 
the field of primatologists and neuroscientists. 
 
Frans de Waal: Primatology and the evolutionary building 
blocks of human morality 
Escaping Lorenz: From aggression to reconciliation 
If Haidt’s moral psychology is symptomatic of a shift in the 
conceptualization of morality without which no moralization of biology 
would be possible today, it is in the writings of the Dutch-born 
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primatologist Frans de Waal that one can find a true personification of 
this constellation of authors for whom today ‘morality comes naturally’. 
In an autobiographical passage of his 1996 Good-Natured, de Waal 
describes how, at the beginning of his career, he went to challenge ‘the 
funding floodgates for research on aggression’ that had been opened 
since the publication of Konrad Lorenz’s controversial On Aggression. 
While studying aggressive behaviours in long-tailed macaques, De Waal 
remembers: 
 
What struck me most while sitting and waiting was how rarely these 
monkeys fought, even though they had a reputation for belligerence 
.. .  the Gestalt that gave me the key to my problem was an embrace 
and kiss between two chimpanzees shortly after a serious 
altercation. Since the embrace occurred between the chief 
opponents of the preceding fight, it struck me as a reconciliation. 
(1996: 163–4) 
 
De Waal’s hugely influential research can be conceived of as a 
massive extension of this preliminary insight about reconciliation (de 
Waal and van Roosmalen, 1979) culminating in his exploration of 
conflict resolution and the study, more generally, of systems of 
reciprocity in primates. Upon this empirical work de Waal has elaborated 
his theoretical position, a full-frontal attack on what he has called the 
Veneer Theory of Morality, the idea – for de Waal iconically represented 
by Thomas Henry Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics (1893) – that morality is 
‘a cultural overlay, a thin veneer hiding an otherwise selfish and brutish 
nature’ (2006: 10). De Waal is well aware of how this picture of morality, 
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which has been largely dominant in the writings of evolutionary 
biologists and science writers, is a profound betrayal of the Darwinian 
legacy, for Darwin himself understood the moral instinct as perfectly 
continuous with social instincts and emotional mechanisms of our 
evolved nature (Flack and de Waal, 2000). And it is exactly the 
Darwinian strategy to situate the origins of moral life entirely within the 
evolutionary framework that de Waal has tried to revive in his research-
program: first, in terms of content, by expanding on Darwin’s many 
observations of altruism and sympathy as phenomena not restricted to 
human life but very much present in the behaviors of many animal 
species; second, in terms of methodology, by looking at our closest 
evolutionary relatives to shed light on human higher faculties, according 
to a principle of ‘evolutionary parsimony’ for which it is wrong to create 
‘a double standard’ of explanations for mechanisms that appear commonly 
shared by human and apes (1996: 64–5). 
 
Exploring the foundations of the tower of morality 
De Waal’s contribution to the present reframing of the moral 
phenomenon has focused on the evolutionary antiquity of what he calls 
‘the building blocks of morality’. Drawing on different sources, from 
Aristotle to Westermarck and Kropotkin, for de Waal human beings are 
‘moral beings to the core’ (2006: 56), born with a strong moral capacity 
designed by natural selection that ‘has provided us with the 
psychological makeup, tendencies, and abilities to develop a compass for 
life’s choices that takes the interests of the entire community into 
account’ (ibid.: 58). De Waal’s research has investigated at length these 
basic psychological tendencies, ‘prerequisites’ or ‘antecedents’ of 
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morality in primate life, contributing decisively to an already important 
literature on cooperation in animals (Dugatkin, 1997). Evidence for 
empathy and sympathetic concern in animals, the existence of group 
loyalty and helping tendencies in all species relying on cooperation, the 
presence of a system of reciprocity and a sense of social regularity in 
many primates, and even ‘inequity aversion’ (among brown capuchin 
monkeys: Brosnan and de Waal, 2003) have been for de Waal 
increasingly documented over the years but remain overlooked because 
of the exaggerated fear of anthropomorphism that characterizes research 
on animal emotions (2006: 24–5). For de Waal the several methods 
through which primates prevent and resolve within-group conflicts, from 
food-sharing to grooming, from peace-making to consolation, represent 
the ‘very building blocks of moral systems’ (1996: 3), evolutionarily 
ancient and pre-dating humanity. Far from being imposed by culture on 
an amoral natural substrate, human morality emerges from this 
reconstruction ‘firmly anchored’ (de Waal, 2006: 55) on these 
evolutionary building blocks. Differences in morality between humans 
and other animals are, for De Waal, only to be seen as differences of 
degree, not of kind. Following this Darwinian strategy, culture is seen by 
de Waal not as the ‘creator’ but ‘the modifier’ (Bonnie and de Waal, 
2004: 214) of the ordinary bio-psychological mechanisms that occupy 
the first level, common to humans and animals, of the ‘tower of 
morality’ (2006). Along with this suggestive metaphor, de Waal 
proposes another image to convey his idea of the evolutionary antiquity 
of a human’s moral sense: a Russian doll ‘in which higher cognitive 
levels of empathy build upon a firm, hard-wired basis’ (2008: 287).5 
                                                     
5 As, for instance, the ‘Perception-Action Mechanism’ (PAM) that for Preston and de Waal underpins 
‘phenomena like emotional contagion, cognitive empathy, guilt, and helping’ (2002: 4). 
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Even from this limited reconstruction, it is evident how De Waal’s 
views have been crucial in the current two-directional movement for 
which morality is deeply relocated at ‘the centre of our much-maligned 
nature’ (1996: 218) and, in reverse, nature itself is increasingly reframed 
as a source of moral and pro-social behaviors. Although de Waal 
recognizes his debt to classical studies of kin selection (Hamilton) and 
reciprocal altruism (Trivers), his arguments for a morality firmly planted 
in the natural world appear much stronger, the result of a different way 
of understanding the interpenetration of the moral and the natural. Not by 
chance, de Waal’s sources go well beyond the strict evolutionary 
tradition to include, for instance, the Confucian philosopher Mencius 
(372–289 BCE) with his belief in ‘the immediacy and force of the 
sympathetic impulse’ and his notion that ‘humans tend toward the good 
as naturally as water  flows  downhill’  (2006: 50–1). 
 
The moral brain 
Along with Haidt’s moral psychology and de Waal’s version of 
primatology, the third most relevant contribution to the current 
biological reframing of morality comes from neuroscience, and in 
particular the new emerging field of the neuroscience of morality, the 
study of the ‘network of brain regions’ (Moll, Zahn et al., 2005: 799) 
involved in moral cognition, emotions and judgement. The neuroscience 
of morality, which integrates insights from cognitive science, social 
psychology, evolutionary biology and anthropology, is a new discipline 
(the first fMRI study is dated 2001 [Greene, Sommerville et al., 2001]), 
but one with important historical roots, as the search for a ‘moral brain’ 
has characterized modernity from at least Gall’s attempt to localize a 
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‘faculty of benevolence’ (Macmillan, 2000; Verplaetse, 2009). In the 
extremely variegated panorama of positions represented today within the 
frame of the neuroscience of morality – Moll, Zahn et al. (2005: 801–3) 
have recently counted 6 different approaches referring to this field – 
there are plausibly at least two shared conceptualizations that have 
profound consequences for the biologization of the moral phenomenon 
that is at stake in this article. 
 
1 Validating the intuitionist turn 
First, neuroscientific studies of morality have completed the revolution 
originating in Haidt’s SIM, offering a sort of experimental validation of 
the idea that automatic processes, often (but not always) emotionally 
laden, are at the center of moral experience (Greene and Haidt, 2002; 
Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Eslinger et al., 2002;  Greene, 2003). Although 
the roles of rationality and cognitive areas of the brain are certainly not 
omitted by neuro-studies of moral decision, many of the neuroscientific 
data have been used so far to claim that when one comes to matters of 
ethical deliberation, one should expect less from cold reasoning than 
from ‘‘‘gut feelings’’ about what is right or wrong in particular cases’ 
(Greene, 2003: 847). As Joshua Greene, a co-author of the first fMRI 
study of moral judgement and a key-figure in the field, writes: 
 
What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human 
moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise – that our moral 
judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, 
which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary 
forces. (Greene, 2008: 72) 
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Though Greene is a proponent (Greene, 2003, 2008) of a ‘dual-
process’ model, in which emotional and cognitive areas of the brain are 
in competition to deliver moral judgement and, philosophically speaking, 
he is very far from attributing epistemic authority to these kinds of 
affectively loaded ancestral intuitions (as ‘neural ‘‘is’’’ is not ‘moral 
‘‘ought’’’: Greene, 2003) – his empirical work has nonetheless 
contributed robustly to shift attention from higher cognition areas to the 
ancient emotional mechanisms of the brain involved in moral decisions. 
Current experimental research further documenting how moral 
judgement can be affected by manipulation of emotional processes is 
extensive. From the study of utilitarian reactions in people with 
prefrontal cortex damage (Koenigs et al., 2007), to the ability of flashes 
of disgust to provoke more severe moral judgements in hypnotized 
people (Wheatley and Haidt, 2005), and finally the manipulation of 
moral responses through induction of positive affects (Valdesolo and De 
Steno, 2006), all these studies have further made the case for a stronger 
role of automatic, affective processes in moral judgement. In spite of 
Greene’s (2003) and Singer’s (2005) rejection of the normative value 
of these emotional responses, and the many words of caution coming 
from a number of moral philosophers (Joyce, 2008; Kahane and Shackel, 
2008), it is undeniable that in other neuroscientific circles these 
emotional responses have been taken as much more reliable guides to 
moral behavior (Damasio, 2003: 147; see also Levy, 2007: 294–7). Such 
a re-collocation of the sources of morality into the automatic responses 
of our evolved nature is not without consequences on the image of nature 
itself. No longer seen as a passive recipient of a mostly rational moral 
thinking, built by education or socialization, or a neutral element at best 
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irrelevant to moral judgement, nature now becomes a powerful actor that 
inclines and endows human beings with a set of dispositions and 
tendencies. The renaissance of a nativist picture of the human as strongly 
inclined to certain moral and pro-social behaviors emerges, even more 
powerfully, from the exploration of a second critical notion coming from 
the emerging discipline of moral neuroscience. 
 
2 The return of the moral sense 
The notions that human beings are endowed not only with ‘a repertoire of 
emotions with a strong moral content’ but also with ‘a natural sense of 
fairness that permeates social perceptions and interactions’ (Moll, de 
Oliveira-Souza, Zahn et al., 2008b: 1; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Eslinger 
et al., 2002: 2730) seem central to most of the authors working on the 
neuroscience of morality. Underneath the different languages in which 
the moral brain is explored today, a recourse to a strong nativist language 
often associated with themes of the moral sense school6 seems to be one 
of the most powerful candidates to occupy the new territory of the 
neuroscience of morality, though this hegemony remains highly 
contested (Churchland, 2011). It is, however, the prevalence of this 
combination of sentimentalism and nativism that gives a moralizing 
flavour to much of the literature reviewed here. In Moll et al., for 
instance, this principle takes the form of what they call a ‘moral 
sensitivity’ (Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Eslinger et al., 2002; Moll, de 
Oliveira- Souza, Krueger et al., 2005; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza and Zahn, 
                                                     
6 Explicit references to the philosophical framework of the ‘moral sense’/‘moral sentiments’ tradition 
appear, among the authors reviewed in this work, in de Waal (1996, 2006); Flack and de Waal (2000); 
Moll, de Oliveira-Souza and Zahn (2008a), Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Zahn and Grafman (2008b); 
Haidt (2001); Greene (2008); Damasio (2003), although this latter emphasizes also the limitations of 
the ‘too optimistic’ Scottish Enlightenment view (2003: 319–20). 
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2008a; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Zahn et al., 2008b), a mechanism by 
which everyday events are automatically tagged with moral values 
(Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger et al., 2005:  803; Moll, de Oliveira-
Souza, Zahn et al., 2008b: 5). Emerging from ‘a sophisticated integration 
of cognitive, emotional, and motivational mechanisms’ (Moll, de 
Oliveira- Souza and Zahn, 2008a: 161) this moral sensitivity is believed 
to guide ‘humans to quickly apprehend the moral implications of a social 
situation’ (ibid.: 165). In the writings of the French neuroscientist Jean-
Pierre Changeux, this innate moral sensitivity becomes a ‘predisposition 
to ethical deliberation’ (Changeux in Changeux and Ricoeur, 2000: 179) 
that the human brain naturally exhibits. Just as our brains have neural 
predispositions and constraints that help us extract from the world a 
certain basic number of ‘natural’ colours (Changeux, 2004: 301), the 
same can be said at the level of morality: evolution has built into the 
human brain ‘not only a moral sense but also all the predispositions of 
moral evaluation necessary to ethical deliberation’ (Changeux in 
Changeux and Ricoeur, 2000: 190). Even for an author as overtly 
sceptical of the ethical authority of our automatic intuitions as Joshua 
Greene, the principle of an innate moral sensitivity remains at the 
forefront. The notion of ‘a powerful ‘‘moral sense’’’ that compels us to 
engage (Greene, 2008: 60) is conceptualized either in the form of a 
‘moral button’ (Greene, Cushman et al., 2009) inside our brain that gets 
pushed under certain circumstances of evolutionary significance, or as a 
‘prepotent emotional response that drives people to say ‘‘no’’’ in a 
scenario like the footbridge case (Greene, 2008: 45). The American 
neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga has presented a stronger version of this 
principle: here Moll’s soft notion of an automatic tagging of everyday 
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experience in moral terms becomes the more audacious idea that the 
brain is ‘ethical’ (2005). For Gazzaniga, neuroscientific explorations are 
bringing to light today the existence of ‘a universal set of biological 
responses to moral dilemmas, a sort of ethics, built into our brains’. This 
‘innate moral-ethics system’ is a natural product of ‘the brain’s automatic 
responses’ and takes the form of an evolved ‘universal moral compass’ 
capable of positively influencing our everyday decisions (2005: 55, 167–
8). Finally, in what is arguably the most ambi- tious version of moral 
nativism, the Universal Moral Grammar (UMG) framework, the human 
brain is said to contain a ‘computationally complex ‘‘moral grammar’’’ 
(Mikhail, 2008: 81), an unconscious mechanism that allows people to 
‘evaluate a limitless variety of actions in terms of principles that dictate 
what is permissible, obligatory, or forbidden’ (Hauser, 2006: 36). In this 
explicit application to morality of the Chomskyan principles of 
linguistics, emotions still play a role, but a less important one than in 
other versions of moral psychology: here, rather than ‘generating a moral 
judgement’, emotions are conceived of only as weights reinforcing our 
intuitions (ibid.: 31). What remains common, however, between the 
UMG paradigm and other more emotion-oriented versions of moral 
psychology, is the nativist belief in a ‘moral instinct’ ‘that naturally 
grows within each child, designed to generate rapid judgements about 
what is morally right or wrong’. This ‘right impulse’ (ibid.: xvii, 419), on 
which moral judgement is automatically based, defines universally innate 
constraints for morality. 
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Attractiveness and ambiguity of the ‘morality-comes-naturally’ 
view 
After the ‘rationalistic tangent’ 
The present repositioning of the moral phenomenon at the centre of 
human nature, and its emotional core in particular, signals an important 
intellectual shift, especially after the long prevalence in modernity of 
philosophical views that have dissociated morality from emotions, the 
body and intuitions. Such a challenge to the ‘‘‘two-hundred-year’’ 
rationa- listic tangent that has started after Hume’ (Haidt, 2012: 116) 
clearly emerges from the selection of authors reviewed in this article. 
Along with these positions, Antonio Damasio’s reappraisal of the role of 
gut feelings (somatic markers) as reliable guides of moral judgement 
(2006[1994]) could have been given a section itself, but nevertheless the 
col- lection of voices examined here adequately illustrates the present 
change in intellectual history. This turn cannot be underestimated and 
before moving to a critical review of its language it seems fair to 
concede it some merits. First, in the relationship between biology and 
social theory, it has to be recognized that, because of the present positive 
reassessment of altruism as a genuine evolutionary possibility, social 
scientists who now want to be in touch with biological facts are no 
longer confronted, as they were when the selfish-gene view was 
prevalent, with the ‘unattractive alternative’ of ‘either insulating a large 
part of human behaviour from biological explanation or .. . explaining 
all human behaviour in terms of individual self-interest’ (Sterelny and 
Griffiths, 1999:  12). The social sciences have started over at least two 
decades to appreciate the possibility of a different take on the 
relationship between altruism and biology, in which altruistic behaviours 
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are seen as an integral part of biological/social facts (Frank, 1988; 
Piliavin and Charng, 1990). Second, in the internal debates of moral 
philosophy, the present turn toward affect-laden intuitions certainly 
represents a healthy extension of what counts as the moral domain. New 
dimensions and sources that were removed from the rationalistic 
narrowing of morality are now included again (Haidt and Kesebir, 2010). 
Third, the emergence of more than two decades of empirical work on the 
affective basis of moral judgement has given us a solid body of evidence 
on the contributions of emotions to moral decision-making. Moral 
rationalism in the future will need to rethink some of its presuppositions 
and make room for this visceral, embodied dimension of moral 
experience. 
 
A critique of the conceptual framework 
However, while this sentimentalist component of morality seems a 
healthy message to take home, the conceptual framework in which many 
of these findings have been located by the three research programs 
examined in my cartography is much more question- able. I want now to 
come back to what I said at the beginning of this article; that is, that the 
sociobiological project of a biologization of morality launched by E. O. 
Wilson almost 40 years ago in his influential Sociobiology (1975) has 
increasingly been reversed today into a moralization of biology. How 
should we evaluate this reversal? Does the present constellation of 
authors reviewed here represent a break with the speculations of the 
1970s? Is the view of an innately moral human nature the champion of a 
new biology compared with the time of E. O. Wilson and Dawkins? My 
conclusion has to be mixed: whereas in terms of content the constellation 
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of authors reviewed here represents a genuine break with the selfish-gene 
biology of the 1970s, in terms of epistemological framework, many 
things have remained continuous with the past. Rather than making a 
radical change, the authors reviewed here produce only a permutation of 
the vocabulary of biology of the 1970s:7 we have moved from the dark 
to the bright side of human nature, while preserving a ‘conceptual 
scaffolding’ (Meaney, 2001) that is increasingly out of touch with the 
new postgenomic (Stotz, 2006; Stotz, Bostanci et al., 2006; Stotz, 2008;  
Dupre´,  2012),  developmental  (Pigliucci,  2001;  West-Eberhard,  2003;  
Robert, 2004) and epigenetic view of biology (Jablonka and Lamb, 1995,  
2005;  Francis,  2012; Carey, 2012) that has made its way into the life-
sciences since the beginning of this century. I do not mean to generalize 
or offer a caricature of the three programs being investigated. Each of 
these programs is different and needs analytic distinction and, in several 
places, there are undeniably efforts to make room for a more refined 
epistemology. However, in spite of these endeavours, Haidt’s moral 
psychology, de Waal’s primatology and the nativist version of the 
neuroscience of morality tend to remain caught in a static view of ‘the 
biological’ that has become increasingly difficult to justify in the light of 
contemporary knowledge. Let us take, for instance, the nativist 
vocabulary that is so profusely used in these three programmes. 
Nativism has certainly been predominant in recent decades, especially in 
psychology and cognitive science (Carruthers et al., 2005–9), and it is 
not surprising therefore that a nativist wave has reached the field of 
morality today. However, other disciplines have been less impressed by 
                                                     
7 As confirmed, for instance, by the celebration of E. O. Wilson as a prophetic figure (2012: 32) who 
got the ‘big picture right’ (2007), in many of J. Haidt’s writings (cf. also the same adoption of the 
term ‘new synthesis’ as a title of one of his major articles: Haidt, 2007). 
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the results of this neo-nativist return. A ‘strong sceptical tradition’ 
(Griffiths, 2009) with roots in philosophy (Cowie, 1999; Prinz, 2012), 
ethology (Lehrman, 1953, 1970; Bateson, 1991; Bateson and Martin, 
1999), and above all developmental biology (Oyama, 2000a[1985], 
2000b; West and King, 1987; Bateson, 1991; Griffiths and Gray, 1994; 
Gottlieb, 1997; Griffiths, 2002; Moore, 2003; Oyama et al., 2001) has 
always been critical of many nativist assumptions. In these last few 
years, this skeptical approach has become increasingly important, making 
the use of the same concept of innateness deeply problematic. In the last 
decade philosophical critiques of innateness, for instance, have 
convincingly emphasized the irretrievable ambiguity of the term 
(Griffiths, 2002, 2009; Mameli and Bateson, 2006, 2007; Mameli, 2008; 
Linquist et al., 2011) claiming that the notion of innateness ‘conflates 
different properties, properties that, according to best cur- rent biological 
and psychological knowledge, need to be kept distinct’ (Mameli and 
Bateson, 2011). In the most extensive study on the topic, Mameli and 
Bateson have analyzed 26 different candidates for a scientific definition 
of ‘innate’ (from ‘not learned’ to ‘genetically influenced’, from 
‘heritable’ to ‘lacking plasticity’), finding all of them problematic and 
open to an abundance of counter-examples (Mameli and Bateson, 2006). 
Rather than a ‘cluster’ (a set of coherently co-occurring properties), the 
concept of innateness resembles what has been called a ‘clutter’ 
(Mameli, 2008), as it ‘conflates theoretically useful properties that 
scientists have found to be distinct’, exactly like what happened to the 
concept of jade in chemistry in the 19th century (Mameli and Bateson, 
2011). Critiques inspired by recent advances in developmental biology 
and neuroscience have also shown how the ambiguity of the term renders 
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‘dubious any neat division of traits into those that are innate and those 
that are acquired through experience’ (Suhler and Churchland, 2011: 
2105). Such a neat dichotomy appears to be the legacy of a ver- nacular, 
pre-scientific language, which seems to ‘come naturally’ to the human 
mind (the folk-biological concept of innateness: Griffiths, 2002; Bateson 
and Mameli, 2007; Griffiths et al., 2009), but which stands today ‘in the 
way of a genuine evolutionary under- standing of human behavioural 
and psychological diversity’ (Linquist et al., 2011). In this context, many 
have suggested that the only possible outcome is to abandon the notion 
of innateness: there is too wide a gap between the nativist vocabulary and 
the new discoveries in developmental and molecular biology and 
neuroscience (Buller, 2006; Mameli and Papineau, 2006; Suhler and 
Churchland, 2011). Even authors who try to res- cue the concept of 
innateness recognize the difficulty of this task and remain wary of the 
limitations of the concept (Samuels, 2002); others tend to suggest a 
critical and deflationary use of it, especially when applied to human 
behaviors (Shea, 2012). It goes beyond the scope of my article to analyze 
in detail the nativist/empiricist controversy in moral philosophy, a debate 
that in modern times goes back at least to Darwin and Mill. This debate 
is very much alive today (Joyce, 2013), as can also be seen in the 
intellectual contributions of the three research programs examined in this 
article, but it seems quite telling that an increasing number of authors 
who align themselves with the ‘Humean revival’ (Sterelny, 2010; Prinz, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2012) do not feel at ease with its neo-nativist 
framework and accept various versions of moral sentimentalism without 
embracing innateness or modularity, or at least only very modest 
versions of it (cf. also Griffiths, 1999; Nichols, 2002, 2004; Machery and 
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Mallon, 2010). Instead of revisiting these critiques, however, which 
often focus on the degree of innateness of moral or emotional 
predispositions, or the significance of framing morality in a modular 
language (Suhler and Churchland, 2011), I want to call attention to a 
problem that has become increasingly important in the last few years for 
a nativist epistemology. My argument  is that, even in its mildest forms, 
as in the case of Gary Marcus’ account of innateness (2004, 2005) whose 
conceptual framework Jon Haidt adopts for his SIM, the nativist 
vocabulary emerging from this and other programs relies on a view of 
the gene that is becoming no longer plausible in contemporary biology. 
Even in Marcus, who correctly avoids any talk of hard-wiring and fixity 
in favour of more plastic notions of pre-wiring and flexibility, the gene 
remains represented as an ‘autonomous agent’ (2004: 59), as something 
‘essential’ (ibid.: 106) that ‘guides’, ‘governs’ and ‘establishes’ (2005: 
31) developmental processes. In spite of the appreciable refinement of 
his analysis (Mameli and Papineau, 2006), the gene in Marcus’ account 
remains more similar to a monarch, something that is ontologically, 
temporally and informationally privileged (or independent) over 
supposedly non-genetic factors, like experience or learning. His 
definition of innate as ‘organized in advance of experience’ (2004: 40) 
on which Haidt relies for his theory (Haidt and Joseph, 2007; Haidt, 
2012) reflects exactly this primacy and the subordinate role of experience 
as a mere refinement of what is already created by genes (Lewkowicz, 
2011). Such a pre-deflationary view of the gene squares poorly with the 
context-dependent view of the gene that is making its way into 
contemporary biology (Fox Keller, 2000; Oyama et al., 2001; Moss, 
2003; Robert, 2004; Mameli, 2005; Griffiths and Stotz, 2007; Barnes and 
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Dupre´, 2008; Parry and Dupre´, 2010; Lewkowicz, 2011). The new 
conceptualization of the gene is dynamic and ‘perspectival’ (Moss, 
2003); it addresses genes as ‘always determined by their cellular context’ 
(Mameli, 2005), ‘embedded inside cells and their complex chemical 
environments’ that are, in turn, embedded in organs, systems and 
societies (Lewkowicz, 2011). On this new post-genomic view, ‘the 
emergence of a new structure and/or function is due to bi–directional 
horizontal interactions’ (Lewkowicz, 2010), ‘the result of an immensely 
complex cascade of bottom-up and top-down co-acting influences’ 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 2009). This new conceptualization of the gene 
profoundly affects any residual idea of innateness, while extending the 
concept of biological inheritance (Mameli, 2005; Jablonka and Lamb, 
2005). Genes are now seen as ‘catalysts’ more than ‘codes’ (Elman et 
al.,  1996), ‘followers’ rather than ‘leaders’ (West-Eberhard, 2003), 
generated by interactions and not pre-existing developmental processes 
(Robert, 2004). ‘Genes-plus accounts of interaction’ (ibid., 2004) are no 
longer tenable, and constructions in which genes are seen to write 
autonomously ‘the first draft’ of the brain ‘during fetal development’, as 
Marcus (2004) and Haidt (2012) claim, are equally untenable. This 
supposedly purely genetic first draft that will be then revised in a second 
stage by experience looks more like a legacy of the past than an analysis 
informed by present knowledge. As Michael Meaney wrote almost 10 
years ago at the dawn of the current epigenetic revival of which he is one 
of the recognized fathers: ‘There are no genetic factors that can be 
studied independently [or ‘‘in advance of’’ to speak the language of 
Marcus (author’s note)] of the environment, and there are no 
environmental factors that function independently of the genome. At no 
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point in life is the operation of the genome independent of the context in 
which it functions.’ Moreover, ‘environmental events occurring at a later 
stage of development . . .  can alter a developmental trajectory’ rendering 
insignificant linear regression studies of nature and nurture (2001). Such 
non-linearity and reversibility of developmental processes make the 
nativist requests for ‘primitives’ (Samuels), ‘starting points’ (Landau), 
‘endowments’ (neuroscience of morality), ‘foundations’ (Haidt), or 
‘building blocks’ (de Waal), meaningless for developmental theorists 
(Spencer et al., 2009; Lewkowicz, 2011). All the ‘stratigraphic’ models 
of the biological as the first layer (stratum in Latin) upon which socio-
cultural processes are grounded (Oyama, 2000a[1985], 2000b; Daston, 
2004) are undermined here. There is no ‘privilege of the origin’ or 
‘privilege of the foundation’ in giving a biological (rather than a 
psychological) explanation, but just another interesting resource to use 
in a dynamic construct. 
 
Biology moralized 
However, why should the dichotomous framework, which sets up an 
opposition between biology as a solid bedrock and cultural/psychological 
processes, persist in the light of the new epistemology of the gene? 
Philosophers of biology have often attributed such persistence to the fact 
that scholars who usually ‘know better’ occasionally lapse into 
epistemologically outmoded views (Griffiths, 1999; Linquist et al., 
2011), possibly confused by notions like innateness that permit 
unjustified inferences too easily (Griffiths, 2002). While this is certainly 
a plausible explanation it does not rule out a second one, namely that this 
outmoded epistemology still pays political dividends today, making it 
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inconve- nient to let it go. I refer to the returns that this stratigraphic 
view of biology still yields today in terms of political hope and 
optimism. Take, for instance, this passage in Frans de Waal’s The Age of 
Empathy: ‘Biology constitutes our greatest hope,’ de Waal writes, ‘one 
can only shudder at the thought that the humanness of our societies 
would depend on the whims of politics, culture, or religion. Ideologies 
come and go, but human nature is here to stay’ (2009: 45; emphases 
added). Here the nature–nurture dichotomy is politically invested in a 
contraposition between a solid and wise biology, validated by evolution, 
and the transient and arbitrary character of cultural and political 
processes, seen as superficial and even whimsical. The validating 
function of this view and its operationalization in terms of optimism are 
reasserted at the end of the book. After contrasting his biological view 
with the disillusions engendered by the failures of past narratives of 
emancipation (from Marxism to feminism to individualism) de Waal 
uses the antiquity of evolution to offer a guarantee for the firm 
foundations of the new biological morality: empathy is not ‘like a toupee 
put on our head yesterday’, de Waal writes, with the risk ‘that  it might 
blow off  tomorrow.  Empathy  is  part of a heritage  as ancient as the 
mammalian line’ engaging ‘brain areas that are more than a hundred 
million years old’: 
 
I derive great optimism from empathy’s evolutionary antiquity [de 
Waal concludes]. [I]t makes it a robust trait that will develop in 
virtually every human being so that a society can count on it and try 
to foster and grow it. It is a human universal. (2009: 208–9; 
emphases added) 
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De Waal’s passage is far from being sui generis. Similar descriptions in 
which biology is depicted as solid bedrock, a firmer layer and a universal 
resource on which ‘society can count’ to anchor an otherwise menaced 
morality (or sociality) are quite a common idiom in the literature 
reviewed here. 8 It is the special status that biology enjoys in such a 
hierarchical view that favors the proliferation of narratives in which ‘the 
biological’ would constitute a sort of primary resource that can guide 
and even correct the pathologies of the social (Gazzaniga, 2005: 54, 84; 
see also Damasio’s invocation of a ‘congenital neurobiological wisdom’ 
[2003: 79]). Therefore, in spite of the growing body of scholarship that 
has undermined such vestigial views of the nature–nurture opposition, a 
dichotomous epistemology remains highly appealing due to its capacity 
to offer a naturalistic agenda at a time when better political offers seem 
to be lacking. Along with the epistemological failure to recognize the 
complexities of the new biology, hope is therefore the second key-player 
in the persistence of this stratigraphic view of biology and the moralizing 
tone it radiates. As Kim Sterelny and Paul Griffiths have aptly remarked: 
‘hope has been rather too fecund a father to belief in the debates on 
evolutionary theories of human behavior. Too few of those involved 
seem to be able to resist ideology and moralising’ (1999: 317). This 
moralizing vein of biologistic writings has typically received little 
attention by sociologists and philosophers (for one exception: Kaye, 
1986) but is, in my view, a great part of the contemporary appeal  of the 
new conceptualization of our evolved nature as a safe harbour for pro-
                                                     
8 See, for instance, the notion that neurobiological findings may constitute a firmer platform for a 
new universalist ethics that might be able to ease some of the ‘conflicts that cultural differences are 
apt to generate’ (Changeux and Ricoeur, 2000: 276). Similar universalist aspirations are all over the 
neuro-scientific literature; see, for instance: Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger et al., 2005; 
Changeux, 1991; Gazzaniga, 2005; Boella, 2008; Changeux et al., 2010. 
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social behaviors (Young, 2012). The extent and breadth of this 
moralization are deeply correlated with the simplistic epistemology of 
what I called the stratigraphic (or foundational) view of biology: E. O. 
Wilson moralized profusely in his On Human Nature (2004[1978]: in 
particular, the last chapter) as evolutionary psychologists did two 
decades later, and as today happens with de Waal or Gazzaniga. 
However, to the extent that the new postgenomic epistemology will 
become more and more established, it can be expected that this 
moralizing attitude will be made increasingly more difficult to sustain 
than in the past, possibly favouring the emergence of less normative, 
more contingent and pluralistic views of the biological. 
 
Notes 
The research and preparation for this article have benefited from a Marie Curie 
ERG grant, FP7- PEOPLE-2010-RG (research titled ‘The Seductive Power of 
the Neurosciences: an Intellectual Genealogy’) at the University of Nottingham 
(UK). As usual, thanks to Andrew Turner for his help with the English 
language in the text. 
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